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Introduction 
 The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York, Washington D.C. and 
Pennsylvania gave rise to a new approach to international counter-terrorism 
measures and one of its most striking features is that the United Nations 
Security Council has become the key coordination organ for global counter-
terrorism strategy. The day after the attacks, Security Council action entered 
this new stage with Resolution 1368 (2001), a text which not only condemned 
the attacks on North American territory, but regarded any act of international 
terrorism as constituting a threat to international peace and security1 
 At that moment and for the first time, the Security Council considered 
terrorism itself as a threat to peace but in addition it proclaimed, and currently 
continues to proclaim, that terrorism is one of the most serious threats in the 
twenty-first century2. This emphasis represented a change of the previous 
Security Council practice which had never before insisted on the serious global 
nature of a certain threat to international peace and security.  
 The significance of describing terrorism as one of the categories in article 
39 of the Charter of the United Nations becomes obvious when we remember 
that it is the legal basis on which the Security Council is entitled to adopt 
                                            
1 See Resolution 1368 (2001), para. 1, “Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the 
horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington D.C. and 
Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like  any acts of international  terrorism, as a threat to international 
peace and security”. Emphasis added. 
2 See Declaration on the Global Effort to Combat Terrorism, attached to Resolution 1377 (2001) 
12 November 2001, the Security Council  “declares that acts of international terrorism constitute one of 
the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century”; and more recently, 
Resolution 1624 (2005) 14 September 2005, preambular para. 3, the Security Council “condemning in the 
strongest terms all acts of terrorism irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever 
committed, as one of the most serious threats to peace and security [...]”.  
mandatory obligations for States pursuant to Chapter VII. It is this classification 
which gives the Security Council coercive powers for countering terrorism and 
that is why defining the concept of threat to peace caused by acts of terrorism is 
of vital interest for determining the scope of the Council’s competences in its 
global sphere of action. This present article was motivated by the importance of 
this definition within a study on international counter-terrorism and therefore 
includes some reflections on the content, limits and consequences of the 
present configuration of the threat to peace caused by acts of terrorism. 
The article is in two sections. The first provides some notes on how the 
threat to international peace and security concept has been shaped by Security 
Council practice and the gradual inclusion of terrorist acts into this category. 
The second section considers the content and limits of the current configuration 
of the threat to peace caused by terrorist acts and some of the implications 
when Security Council adopts decisions under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. 
This study ends with some brief conclusions where the author reflects on 
some of the main issues dealt with here which are offered for inclusion in the 
open-ended, ongoing debate raised by the 7th Symposium of International 
Humanitarian Law on the International Law Dimension of Terrorism. 
 
I. Terrorist acts in the configuration of the threat to international peace 
and security. 
For a correct analysis of the elements which currently constitute the 
threat to international peace and security caused by acts of terrorism, it is 
appropriate to consider the evolution of this notion in the practice of the United 
Nations Security Council. The following section -- offers some general notes on 
the way the threat to international peace and security concept has developed, 
this analisys will allow to evaluate the significance and novelty of classifying 
terrorist acts in this way. 
In addition to this brief analysis, the second epigraph contains a study of 
the way terrorist acts have gradually been introduced into the notion of threat to 
international peace and security. Resolutions after September 11, 2001 
represent a new approach to terrorism by the Security Council, but cannot be 
understood without examining the previous practice on specific counter-
terrorism strategies.  
 
I.I. The threat to international peace and security concept in United 
Nations Security Council practice.  
 Under article 39 of the UN Charter the Security Council is competent to 
determine the existence of an act of aggression, a breach of the peace or a 
threat to international peace and security. Once such a classification has been 
made, the Security Council is authorised to adopt coercive measures pursuant 
to Chapter VII in the Charter3. Of the three categories included in article 39, 
there is no doubt that the threat to international peace and security was 
originally configured as the most generic and consequently has been the one 
with the greatest capacity to evolve4. The notion can therefore be regarded as 
being open-ended and political, and is only made specific when the Security 
Council exercises its wide discretionary powers to make a value judgement on 
particular circumstances. 
  In conformity with these powers, the Security Council has used this 
category widely in recent decades, declaring many different situations to be 
threats to international peace and security. While practice based on this notion 
was scarce until 1990, the proclamation of a “New World Order” permitted 
greater cooperation between the permanent members and this led the Security 
Council to deal not only with situations of armed conflict but also others in which 
the task of maintaining international peace and security was broadly interpreted. 
Currently and after long practice, there is certain consensus that the 
threat to peace concept cannot only be linked to the risk of war. Study of 
                                            
3 Opinion is divided as to whether prior article 39 classification is essential before the Security 
Council can act on the basis of articles 41 and 42. Although the academic debate remains, it should be 
noted that Security Council practice has been uniform, so that it has always alluded to the presence of 
article 39 circumstances when adopting Chapter VII decisions. On this debate, see, in particular, Jean-
Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies. Commentaire Article par Article, 2º Édition, 
Económica, Paris, p. 708. 
4 At the San Francisco Conference there was discussion about whether or not to specify the 
content of the notions included in article 39. The debate on this would have been arduous and difficult to 
conclude successfully given that the Great Powers clearly preferred open categories which would give the 
Security Council a broad margin for interpretation. In subsequent developments after the adoption of the 
Charter of the United Nations the concept of act of aggression has obtained greater legal specification 
through Resolution of the General Assembly 3314 (XXXIX), of 14 December 1974. However there has 
been no such evolution in the other article 39 categories. For further analysis of the negotiations at the 
San Francisco Conference see Ibidem, p. 647. 
Security Council Resolutions which use the concept suggests that it can include 
situations which affect fundamental values of the International Community, such 
as racial discrimination, human rights or the need to assist the victims of 
humanitarian crises5. 
The threat to international peace and security concept has evolved in 
such a way that the situations where the Security Council has acted pursuant to 
Chapter VII have been extended and so the study of the notion forms part of the 
debate on the legal limits to the Council’s competencies. Discussion of this 
aspect has been an arduous task and there is still a long way from providing a 
unanimous answer6. The diversity of actions which have been classified as a 
threat to peace demands case by case examination, although some general 
ideas can be outlined. 
Pursuant to article 24 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council’s primary 
objective is to maintain international peace and security and in carrying out its 
duties, it must respect the purposes and principles established in the Charter. 
Articles 1 and 2 of the U.N. Charter are the fundamental parameters for 
evaluating the lawfulness of Security Council actions. Consequently, the 
Council’s decisions must be observed case by case, according to these 
parameters, which limit the wide margin of discretion it has been given by the 
Charter. 
Of course, the problem lies in deciding which organ is competent to carry 
out this supervisory task. The absence of any ruling on the questions of law 
raised by the Lockerbie case represents the loss of an important opportunity for 
                                            
5 The Council itself declared in 1992 that “the absence of war and military conflicts amongst 
States does not in itself ensure international peace and security”, as “non-military sources of instability in 
the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security”. In 
particular, the Council expressed concern “over acts of international terrorism” and stressed the need “for 
the international community to deal effectively with all such acts”. Declaration of the President of the 
Council on The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, UN 
Doc. S/23500 of 31 January 1992, p. 3. 
This position is also consist with the broad definition of maintaining the peace used by other 
United Nations organs. In particular, see the maintaining the peace concept used by the Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his report An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and 
Peace-Keeping, of 17 June 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, paras. 12-14 and 22. 
6 Practice shows that the threat to international peace and security concept has a clearly political 
and sociological content making it complicated to analyse and evaluate.  Alejandro Rodríguez Carrión has 
made some interesting comments on the difficulties with analysing the concept of threat of the use of 
force which can also be applied to this notion, see “Las nociones de “amenaza” and “uso” del arma 
nuclear”, in La licitud del uso de las armas nucleares en los conflictos armados, by Pablo Antonio 
Fernández Sánchez (Coord.), Universidades de Huelva y Sevilla-Cruz Roja Española-Ministerio de 
Defensa, pp. 101- 118, p. 102 et seq. 
the International Court of Justice to gives its opinion on whether it is competent 
to review the legality of Security Council actions7. Finally, and in view of the 
political solution to the case, the Court has only been able to express its opinion 
on the provisional measures requested by Libya concerning the Council’s 
Chapter VII counter-terrorism decisions.  
The current description of terrorism as a threat to peace could give rise to 
controversy similar to that surrounding the Lockerbie case, so future practice 
may provide the courts with a new opportunity for a judicial pronouncement on 
the limits of Security Council powers in such a vital area for state sovereignty as 
international counter-terrorism. Until the opportunity arises, the debate on the 
legal limits to Security Council action will remain open and its main source of 
reference will continue to be compliance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
 
I.II. The gradual inclusion of terrorism as a the threat to international 
peace and security. 
 In its post September 11, 2001 Resolutions, the Security Council began a 
new practice by considering acts of terrorism within the category of a threat to 
peace and security. This new approach was possible because of renewed 
consensus among Security Council members, in particular its permanent 
members and because of this new step was based on previous counter-
terrorism experience. 
The first time the Security Council referred to terrorism was in Resolution 
579 (1985), of 18 December 1985 concerning suicide attempts perpetrated in 
the airports of Rome and Vienna. The text condemned “all acts of hostage-
taking and abduction” and considered them to be “manifestations of 
international terrorism”8 Despite the fact that no allusion was made to the 
                                            
7 For more in-depth analysis of the Lockerbie case and its influence on the study of 
reviewing the legality of Security Council counter-terrorism actions see in particular, Jean Allain, 
“The Legacy of Lockerbie: Judicial Review of Security Council Actions or the First Manifestation 
of “Terrorism” as a Threat to International Peace?”, Indian Journal of International Law, vol. 44, 
issue 1, 2004, pp. 74-112; Scott S. Evans, “The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored 
Terrorism, Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine”, Maryland Journal of 
International Law and Trade, vol. 18, 1994, pp. 21-76; y Jonathan A. Frank, “A Return to 
Lockerbie and the Montreal Convention in the Wake of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks: 
Ramifications of Past Security Council and International Court of Justice Action”, Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy, no. 30, 2002, pp. 532-546. 
8 See para. 1 and 5. 
notions in article 39, terrorism was considered to be “offences of grave concern 
to the international community, having severe adverse consequences for the 
rights of the victims and for the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation 
among States”9. Since this first approach, the Security Council has described 
acts of terrorism as a threat to international peace and security on several 
occasions10. 
The Security Council often condemns the use of terrorism in the context 
of armed conflicts. In cases such as Kosovo or Georgia, the Security Council 
has included terrorist acts in a situation classified as a threat to international 
peace and security. Thus terrorism was beginning to be taken into account in 
article 39 decisions, but as just another aspect of armed conflict, not in its own 
right.  
There are also other significant situations where more specific reference 
has been made to terrorist attacks in the threat to peace classification. These 
include Resolutions on the aircraft accident in Lockerbie in 1992; the 
Resolutions generated as the result of the assassination of the Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak in 1995; the Resolutions on the Taliban Regime’s 
support of terrorism issued between 1998 and 2001. In these cases, the 
fundamental difference with post September 11 Security Council practice lies in 
the fact that the threat to international peace and security is being invoked on 
the basis of the behaviour of the States involved and not on the acts of terrorism 
themselves. 
Thus in the Lockerbie case, for example, Resolutions 731 (1992) and 
748 (1992) of 21 January and 31 March 1992 respectively did not consider the 
destruction of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988 as a 
threat to peace but rather the subsequent action by Libya. The United States 
and the United Kingdom requested the extradition of two suspects from Libya, 
while France called for Libya’s collaboration in the investigation. Libya refused 
to meet the requests and the threat to peace classification is based mainly on 
that behaviour and not on the terrorist act.  
                                            
9 See preambular para. 2. 
10 For more in-depth analysis of the evolution of the consideration of terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security see Ben Saul: “Definition of "Terrorism" in the UN Security Council: 
1985-2004”, Chinese Journal of International Law, no. 4, 2005, pp. 141-166. 
Similar considerations can be made concerning the other two situations 
mentioned above. Analysis of Resolution 1054 (1996), of 26 April 1996 shows 
that the main motivation for the threat to peace classification was Sudan’s 
refusal to extradite those suspected of assassinating President Hosni Mubarak. 
Before 2001, the Taliban refusal to cooperate with counter-terrorism was the 
prime motivation behind the threat to peace description and not the various 
attacks which took place with the suspected participation of Al-Qaeda11.  
Therefore, and according to the cases noted here, it can be stated that 
the Security Council has condemned several terrorist attacks but did not include 
them in their own right in any of the article 39 concepts. The threat to 
international peace and security in the above cases was due to behaviour 
attributable to a particular State which refused to collaborate with counter-
terrorism rather than the terrorist attacks themselves12.  Consistent with its 
pronouncement, the Security Council decided on specific sanctions against the 
States which directly or indirectly helped, encouraged or protected terrorist 
groups. 
Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) of the 12 and 28 September 
2001 represent a fundamental departure from the above practice. These texts 
determine that the September 11 terrorist acts in the United States and any act 
of terrorism are in their own right a threat to international peace and security. It 
is thus international terrorism itself which is classified as a threat to international 
peace and security, wherever and by whomsoever committed. This line of 
argument has subsequently been used by the Security Council to describe 
specific attacks like part of the threat to peace and security caused by terrorism. 
Practice prior to September 11 did not escape legal controversy but this 
controversy has increased since the appearance of a general and permanent 
threat to peace category such as that used to define terrorist acts13. Precisely 
                                            
11 See for example Resolution 1267 (1999), of 15 October 1999. The Security Council included 
in this text important counter-terrorism measures including the creation of an inspection Committee, but 
these were based on a classification of threat to peace motivated by “the failure of the Taliban authorities 
to respond to the demands in paragraph 13 of resolution 1214 (1998)” (Preambular, para. 8). 
12 For more in-depth analysis see Valeria Santori, “The UN Security Council’s (Broad) 
Interpretation of the Notion of the Threat to Peace in Counter-terrorism”, in Giuseppe Nesi (ed.),  
International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism. The United Nations and Regional Organizations 
in the Fight Against Terrorism, Ashgate, England-USA, 2006, pp. 89-111, p. 90. 
13 Vera Gowlland was already raising doubts as to the legality of the reference to 
terrorist acts in the threat to peace concept when she referred to the Lockerbie case, noting in 
particular that “as regards the Council’s broad discretion under Article 39, one may invoke in 
because terrorism in general is regarded as a threat to peace, the Security 
Council can include in this concept situations provoked by private bodies 
independently of their relation with a State and consequently it can decide 
counter-terrorism actions which attempts to cover all types of perpetrators and 
circumstances of perpetration. The following sections offer an analysis of some 
of the issues raised by this global approach to the threat to peace and security 
caused by acts of terrorism.  
 
II. The essential characteristics of the current definition of the threat to 
international peace and security cause by terrorist acts. 
The current configuration of the threat to international peace and security 
by acts of terrorism is a departure from common Security Council practice 
whereby specific situations, with determinate characteristics were classified 
under article 39. In comparison, Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) 
marked the beginning of a threat to international peace and security concept 
that was general and permanent. This new approach brings with it significant 
areas of uncertainty and lacunae which writers on international law have been 
quick to point out. 
The legal problems which arise from the general permanent nature of the 
threat to peace from terrorist acts are made heightened by the absence of a 
definition of terrorism. The Security Council’s decision to offer no explicit 
indication in its Resolutions of what acts should be classified as terrorism 
creates even more ambiguity in a classification which initially was designed to 
be generic.  
The following sections include analysis of the defining characteristics in 
the current configuration of the threat to international peace and security caused 
by acts of terrorism. A third element has been added to the above which is that 
the international character of terrorism has been considered irrelevant when 
describing the threat to peace. This last characteristic will have important 
consequences when it comes to defining the Security Council’s powers 
                                                                                                                                
this context the doctrine of abuse of rights arising from failure by states to exercise their rights in 
good faith and with due regard to the consequences”. See Vera Gowlland, “The Relationship 
between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie 
Case”,  American Journal of International Law, vol. 88, no. 4, 1994, pp. 643-677, p.663. 
concerning global counter-terrorism action, and the limits imposed by the 
international law regime on State counter-terrorism. 
  
II.I The general, permanent nature of the article 39 description.  
In its post September 11 Resolutions, the Security Council describes the 
threat to international peace and security caused by acts of terrorism as being 
general and permanent. General, because it refers to any act of terrorism 
perpetrated by any individual or group anywhere. Permanent, because as it is a 
threat which can come from any type of terrorism it is to be expected that the 
description will remain in place for an unlimited time.  
By configuring a type of generic threat to peace, the Security Council is 
not referring to some specific events but includes an enormous variety of 
actions in the article 39 description. This is undoubtedly a departure from 
previous practice where the existence of a threat to peace was determined by 
evaluating a specific situation. This change of approach will affect in particular 
the Security Council’s capacity to act on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations because this generic description gives it a broad 
authorisation to adopt coercive measures. Thus a sort of two-fold classification 
of events is established, firstly, a generic description of the threat to 
international peace and security and secondly an evaluation whereby, in the 
framework of this broad authorisation, the Security Council decides what action 
to take in terms of specific counter-terrorism measures.  
The permanent nature of the configuration of the threat to peace caused 
by acts of terrorism is also new in Security Council practice. The Security 
Council normally used the threat to peace description with reference to a 
specific situation and real events14  By considering terrorism itself as a threat to 
peace, however, it must be understood that the Security Council not only refers 
to situations which are current when it issues specific Resolutions, but to any 
future moment when similar events occur. In other words, use of Chapter VII is 
being authorised for future circumstances which are not those which the 
Security Council is considering at the moment of describing the threat to peace. 
                                            
14 Before 11 September 2001, doubts were raised as to the legality of Security Council 
actions in reference to a potential threat. This occurred for example in the Lockerbie case with 
regard to the action taken against Libya. See on this point Jean Allain, op. cit., p. 81 et seq.  
As Valeria Santori has highlighted “it appears that with Resolution 1373 and 
following, the Council engaged its future action by asserting, in a given moment 
in time, that any hypothetical future act of terrorism is a threat to the peace”15  
 Given this new practice, the key question is if the Security Council has 
article 39 authorisation to designate a general permanent phenomenon as a 
threat to peace. As Christian Tomuschat already highlighted in his course at 
The Hague Academy of International Law in 1993, article 39 should not be 
constructed as preventing the Security Council from deciding actions in general 
terms if the phenomenon to which it refers are incompatible with the 
International Community’s general interest. This author developed a joint 
construction of Charter Articles 39 and 24 to show that the very concept of 
threat to peace involves the idea of prevention, so that nothing prevents the 
Security Council from referring to general aspects of the threat and acting in 
consequence16.  
 Of course there is no doubt that the threat to peace concept is 
evolutionary and political in nature and that since the 1990s it has shown that it 
is quite capable of expanding its operational capacity. For that reason no-one 
should be too surprised if it departs from more traditional concepts to include 
others which currently require global action. This might be the case of terrorism 
and even other phenomena such as organised crime which could be given 
similar treatment. If we accept this, however, there is then an additional problem 
which will be dealt with in the following section but can be mentioned here, 
namely that this general description is accompanied by the absence of a 
definition of terrorism. This creates a situation which puts specification of when 
certain acts are to be considered a threat to international peace and security 
into the hands of national legal systems. As Ben Saul has highlighted, “it is one 
thing for the Council to identify particular incidents as terrorist -as with 
aggression- but quite another matter for it to allow States to arbitrarily do so, in 
the absence of any "criteria of reference"”17  
                                            
15 See Valeria Santori, op. cit. , p. 105. 
16 See Christian Tomuschat, “Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will”, 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de la Haye,  vol. 241-IV, 1993, pp. 199-374, p. 
344 and 345. 
17 See, op. cit., p. 159.  
 The issue of the general, permanent nature of the description of the 
threat to international peace and security caused by acts of terrorism directly 
influences the type of action which can be decided as a result. Chapter VII 
characterisation of terrorism in general as a threat to peace rather than just 
specific acts makes it possible to adopt counter-terrorism measures with a 
general permanent nature rather than only in relation to certain situations or 
groups. 
This is the case of the systems based on Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 
September 2001 and Resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004. The first of these 
resolutions requires member States to adopt national counter-terrorism 
measures, which include controlling funds and increased international 
cooperation on prevention matters. It is also mandatory to permit the Counter-
Terrorism Committee to monitor implementation. 
Further measures are contemplated by Resolution 1540 (2004) 
concerning weapons of mass destruction. This text is the result of concern that 
non-state actors “may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and their means of delivery” and consequently it requires 
States to adopt measures to prevent the acquisition or use of weapons of mass 
destruction by non-state actors and their proliferation. It also envisages the 
establishment of a Committee of the Security Council which States must report 
to every six months with information on the measures adopted. 
It is clear that by establishing these systems the Security Council is 
considerably extending its powers for global counter-terrorism. The Council has 
established Chapter VII counter-terrorism cooperation systems which are 
mandatory for all States in the International Community. While most of the 
provisions in under both resolutions have arisen from earlier treaty development 
as part of the international fight against terrorism, Security Council decisions are 
using Chapter VII to extend some treaty obligations to subjects who have not 
consented them. 
This again raises doubts about the legal limits to Security Council 
powers. The general permanent description of terrorism as a threat to peace 
has permitted general schemes to be put in place to increase the level of 
counter-terrorism action in each State. It thus replaces State capacity to 
develop counter-terrorism conventions because Resolution 1373 (2001) and 
1540 (2004) obligations are coercive and therefore pre-eminent over any other 
legal obligation deriving from negotiation or consensus. 
 Decisions of this type can be seen as forming part of the way the 
Security Council has broadened the scope of its competencies over recent 
decades as clearly exemplified by the creation of the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, I agree on 
this point with Alexander Marschik who points out that the above measures 
were still based “on the existence of a specific situation, restricted in area and 
time, that the Council considered a threat to the peace” while Resolution 1373 
(2001) “was the defining step towards abstract law-making, when it deemed 
abstract terrorism a threat against peace and security and imposed legal 
obligations on states to adopt specific measures, normally prescribed by 
international treaties”. 
 On the issue of terrorism, the Security Council has assumed a general 
regulatory capacity over and above its usual practice based on evaluating 
specific situations and case by case decision-making19. The Security Council is 
assuming a de facto quasi-legislative competence which replaces States’ 
negotiating power. Clearly, these powers were not envisaged in the Charter of 
the United Nations, although two arguments are commonly used to argue that 
they do in fact conform to the Charter and Public International Law: the need for 
efficient global counter-terrorism measures, and opinio iuris favourable to the 
assumption of new competencies.     
 John Harrington et al. are clear exponents of the first line of argument. 
These authors defend the idea that the Security Council can replace the 
negotiation process on treaty obligations precisely because it “is better able to 
shear way extraneous considerations from the treaty negotiation process and 
                                            
18 See Alexander Marschik, “The Security Council’s Role: Problems and Prospects in 
the Fight Against Terrorism”, in Giuseppe Nesi (ed.),  International Cooperation in Counter-
terrorism. The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Fight Against Terrorism, 
Ashgate, England-USA, 2006, pp. 69-80, p. 77. 
19 In this regard, Paul Szasz considers Resolution 1373 (2001) to be a new tool for the Security 
Council to develop its capacity to create international legal norms, see  “The Security Council Starts 
Legislating”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 96, no. 4, 2002, pp. 901-905, p. 902. Ilias 
Bantekas has pointed out that the obligations established by Resolution 1373 (2001) create a system 
comparable to that which could have been developed through treaty negotiations, see “The International 
Law of Terrorist Financing”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 97, no. 2, 2003, pp. 315-333, p. 
326. John Harrington et al. express similar opinions on Resolution 1540 (2004), see “International Legal 
Development in Review: 2005. Public International Law”, International Lawyer, no. 40, 2006, pp. 487-
503, p. 491. 
make decisions more quickly that have more direct and exclusive bearing on 
resolving the security threat”. They also add that “When the Security Council, 
acting pursuant to Chapter VII, signifies that the threat is a matter of 
international peace and security, the process is not meant to epitomize 
participatory democracy of sovereign states, it is meant to get the job done”20.  
 The argument commonly used to support the existence of a favourable 
general consensus on this new development of Security Council competencies, 
is that it is evidenced by the close collaboration of States with the system 
introduced by Resolution 1373 (2001). In fact this system has become the most 
successful in terms of the number of national reports presented21. It would 
appear therefore that State practice shows generalised support for the 
measures adopted in Resolution 1373 (2001). 
Some considerations can be made with regard to both of the above 
arguments. Defending the lawfulness of Security Council actions on the basis of 
efficiency is open to debate. Firstly, it is debatable whether it is possible to 
evaluate the efficiency of systems which have been operating for such a short 
time. Secondly, and more importantly from the legal point of view, it is difficult to 
defend the lawfulness of certain decisions on the basis of their efficiency when 
they may be endangering some of the purposes and principles in the Charter of 
the United Nations. The consequences deriving from the newly assumed 
competencies may prove highly controversial from the legal point of view, since 
as Alexander Marschik has highlighted “a Security Council that acts as world 
legislator would affect not only how free States are in accepting binding norms 
but also -in view of the veto of the P5- whether all States are still equal in norm 
creation and in suffering the consequences of norm violation”22. 
There are also doubts over the existence of opinio iuris favourable to this 
new area of Security Council competence. It is true that States have welcomed 
the system based on Resolution 1373 (2001), but it remains to be seen whether 
this support continues when the main action of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee changes from monitoring to other more compulsory measures. In 
                                            
20 See John Harrington and others, op. cit., p. 492 and 493. 
21 For analysis of the success of the system under Resolution 1373 (2001) see Curtis A. 
Ward, “Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations 
Security Council”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, no. 8, 2003, pp. 289-305, p. 299 et seq.  
22 See Alexander Marschik, op. cit., at p. 79. 
fact, some States have already shown their reticence over the obligatory nature 
of the good practice guides produced by the Security Council23 
 In addition to this, the consensus around Resolution 1373 (2001) is not 
the same as that for the system established by Resolution 1540 (2004) despite 
the fact that this second text is also based on the classification of terrorism as a 
threat to international peace and security. Several States have expressed 
doubts as to the legality and legitimacy of the decision to establish the system. 
India in particular has shown concern at the Security Council’s tendency in 
recent years to assume legislative power. 
 In view of the above then, it appears there are continuing doubts as to 
the legality of a general, permanent classification of terrorism as a threat to 
peace and its possible consequences. As already mentioned, these doubts are 
growing due to the absence of a definition of terrorism in Security Council 
Resolutions. 
 
II.I The absence of a definition of terrorism. 
Writers on international law have highlighted at great length the problems 
caused by the absence of a definition of terrorism when classifying it as a threat 
to international peace and security. The Security Council has obviously 
preferred not to include defining notes on what constitutes an act of terrorism in 
its Resolutions, and so the only way of deducing some of the elements involved 
is by observing the attacks which the Council expressly condemns. This 
observation reveals that the Security Council includes the acts of individuals 
and private entities for which it may or may not be possible to establish a link 
with a specific State. Beyond this general appreciation, however, little can be 
                                            
23 When the Counter-Terrorism Committee started to use guidelines from other 
specialised bodies in this field, it started to receive complaints from countries such as China 
who objected to being subject to rules developed in organisations which it is not party to. On the 
criticisms and objections which the system under Resolution 1373 (2001) may face in the future 
see Eric Rosand “Resolution 1373 and the CTC: The Security Council’s Capacity-building”, in 
Giuseppe Nesi (ed.),  International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism. The United Nations and 
Regional Organizations in the Fight Against Terrorism, Ashgate, England-USA, 2006, pp. 81-88, 
p. 86 et seq.  
24 See the statements by Indonesia, Nepal, India and Pakistan at the 4950th meeting of the 
Security Council on 22 April 2004 (UN-Doc. S/PV.4950). 
derived from its reiterative pronouncements on the general global threat to 
peace caused by terrorism25. 
The main consequence of the absence of a Security Council definition of 
terrorist acts is that it is left to States to assess which events will be classified as 
such. Thus, national legal systems are expressly allowed to make their own 
definitions of terrorism which may be divergent and contradictory. This also 
clearly provides States with an opportunity to abuse the definition of terrorism in 
order to persecute dissidents and violate basic human rights under the umbrella 
of Security Council actions to counter-terrorism26. 
The Security Council itself has tried to alleviate this situation with a non-
binding definition in Resolution 1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004. This definition 
refers to terrorism as “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with 
the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government 
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which 
constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism”27. 
This definition poses serious problems which prevent it from solving the 
difficulties caused by the lack of a definition of what constitutes a terrorist act. 
Firstly, the pronouncement arrives three years after the first Resolutions which -
- declared that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security and 
therefore arrives too late -- to be fully operational. Secondly, and even more 
significantly, it should be remembered that the definition is non-binding so the 
conclusion must be that States retain their capacity to make a unilateral 
definition. Thirdly, despite being inspired by prior treaty developments on 
counter-terrorism and General Assembly debates, the definition does not 
include any of the definitions contained in the treaties and therefore may 
contradict them. 
                                            
25 The Security Council commonly refers to certain terrorist attacks and sometimes even alludes 
to the perpetrators. After that, however, it can only determine that they form part of a global threat which 
is terrorism and therefore this channel of analysis is quite limited in terms of the search for a general 
definition of terrorism. 
26 On the problems raised by Security Council action in relation to human rights see in 
particular, Mark D. Kielsgard, “A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism”, California 
Western International Law Journal, no. 36, 2006, pp. 249-302.  
27 See Resolution 1566 (2004), par. 3. 
This would suggest that the definition of terrorism in Resolution 1566 
(2004) can only serve as a non-binding guide for developing State counter-
terrorism obligations and it is destined to become just another element in the 
international debate on the search for a generally accepted definition. The 
Security Council has preferred therefore to limit itself to expressing a guide 
definition rather than offering a definitive version of what must be defined as 
terrorism within its sphere of action.  
In fact, the debate on the appropriateness of reaching a general definition 
on terrorism has been going on in the United Nations General Assembly for 
decades and a unanimously accepted solution is still a long way off. More than 
a few voices are calling for the struggle to be abandoned in favour of a more 
pragmatic approach which avoids general notions and focuses on negotiation in 
specific events. Practice suggests that this is in fact the position of the Security 
Council as its entire counter-terrorism action has been developed without 
including any definition of terrorism28 Despite this pragmatic view, however, it 
must not be forgotten that the absence of a definition poses some additional 
legal problems when terrorism is described as a threat to peace and security.  
Firstly, the lack of a definition makes the threat to peace concept itself 
more ambiguous, reinforcing the Security Council’s discretionary powers to 
adopt specific counter-terrorism measures. The difficulty in pointing out the 
limits to this discretion which allow global counter-terrorism measures is to 
assere the respect for Charter purposes and principles. Here, I would like to 
return to another already-mentioned aspect which is that the lack of a definition 
of terrorism authorises national systems to make the final decision on a 
situation that -- is an article 39 threat to international peace and security.  
The authorization to States to define terrorism creates legal uncertainty 
because different, divergent or contradictory definitions may appear. In fact, the 
different interpretations on the limits and nature of the acts that can be classified 
as terrorist acts have already caused discrepancies in national legislation and 
regional treaties on the subject. Furthermore, the situation is negative for the 
                                            
28 The Counter-Terrorism Committee’s position is entirely consistent with a pragmatic approach 
which attempts to evaluate each specific situation in its decision-making, avoiding any type of general 
definition. On this point Ben Saul has noted that “the CTC proposed an ad hoc approach, deciding 
whether an act is terrorism "where necessary" and referring political controversies to the Council or other 
bodies. Its mandate is based on a pragmatic view that terrorism can be combated even without agreement 
on its criminal wrongfulness in all situations”, op. cit., p. 157. 
coherent development of the counter-terrorism systems established by the 
Security Council.  
 In particular, and in regard to the system established by Resolution 1373, 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee has already indicated that one of the 
problems hampering its full operational capacity is precisely the lack of a 
definition of terrorism29. From the moment it is left to States to define terrorism, 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee will find it difficult to take action on groups 
which are not considered terrorists under national legislation. Problems such as 
this are unresolved and solutions will have to come from the practice on a case 
by case basis. The solution should be based on the search for consensus 
among the national systems involved. 
 These operational problems are joined by the fact that States, in relation 
to their own interests, may be inclined to develop definitions of terrorism to 
permit counter-terrorism operations which infringe basic human rights. As there 
is no general definition, there is the risk that States might develop selective 
definitions according to their interests in persecuting or suppressing different 
groups. This has already been publicly criticised by international agencies and 
non governmental organisations which have highlighted the use of counter-
terrorism as an excuse for systematic human rights violations with certain 
individuals and groups30.  
Different measures have been adopted to -- alleviate the situation. Firstly, 
a dialogue has been established between the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
and the Human Rights Committee to try to prevent that Resolution 1373 can be 
used as the framework for systematic human rights violations31. Furthermore, 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee is currently asking for national reports to 
include data on human rights compliance in order to develop greater 
international control in this area. 
Practice will show if the measures adopted are able to mitigate the 
lacunae resulting from the lack of a single definition of terrorism in the – 
general, permanent definition of threat to international peace and security. 
Significant areas of uncertainty remain. 
                                            
29 See Alexander Marschik, op. cit., p. 71. 
30 For more in-depth analysis see Ben Saul, op. cit., p. 158 et seq. 
31 See UN Doc. S/PV.4512, page 3, 4512th Meeting of the Security Council, 15 April 2002. 
  II.II. The irrelevance of the international character of terrorism. 
The absence of a definition of terrorism in Security Council practice also 
raises the problem of specifying whether the classification as threat to 
international peace and security covers only international terrorism or also 
includes domestic terrorism. In this case the answer can be found by examining 
the many different specific Security Council actions, which also reveal how the 
Council’s position has evolved. 
The Security Council’s declaration in Resolution 1368 (2001) that any act 
of terrorism is a threat to international peace and security, included the adjective 
international. This pronouncement appears to reveal the Council’s initial 
position, and in subsequent decisions it referred to acts of international 
terrorism. This first approach, however, was later modified as the Security 
Council has also referred to acts of terrorism of a merely internal nature on 
several occasions.   
Thus for example, Resolution 1465 (2003) of 13 February 2003, 
concerning the attack on Club Nogal in Bogotá on 7 February 2003 which was 
attributed to FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), regarded 
this act of terrorism which was not classified as international, as being a threat 
to international peace and security. Resolution 1530 (2004) of 11 March 2004 
concerning the attacks perpetrated in Madrid used similar terms and indicated 
that the perpetrators were the armed group ETA. Subsequent police 
investigations showed that the perpetrators belonged to a type of terrorism 
which could be classified as international, however, this information cannot 
affect a classification of threat to peace where the focus is on terrorism itself.  
It should therefore be considered that terrorism of an internal nature is 
also classified as a threat to international peace and security. In this sense, as 
Valeria Santori has pointed out “acts of terrorism of a “domestic” nature acquire 
an international relevance consisting precisely in the fact that according to the 
Council they involve a threat to international peace and security”32. It is 
terrorism that is being classified as a general and permanent threat to peace 
and under this classification it is possible to state that any act of terrorism by 
                                            
32 See Valeria Santori, op. cit., p. 98. 
whomsoever and wherever perpetrated comes within the sphere of global 
counter-terrorism measures. 
This position corresponds to the trend in international cooperation in this 
area and recent Security Council practice in dealing with certain situations of a 
domestic nature. There is no doubt that in recent years the international fight 
against terrorism has been concerned not only with clearly international 
terrorism but also with that of a domestic nature whose prevention or 
punishment may involve international subjects other than the affected State33 . 
This cooperation has been especially fluid in the regional sphere where 
international negotiation on counter-terrorism issues is facilitated by converging 
interests.  
Furthermore, describing acts of domestic terrorism as a threat to peace is 
not unconnected with a tendency in Security Council practice after the end of 
the cold war to include different internal situations within the scope of this 
notion.  Analysis of Council practice shows that some of these situations have 
no international character but refer to clearly domestic situations and private 
entities.  
Antecedents to this classification are apparent in Resolution 217 (1965) 
of 20 November 1965 which described the situation of racial discrimination in 
Rhodesia as a threat to peace and security, or in Resolution 418 (1977) of 4 
November 1977 on South Africa. The main examples, however, appear in 
relation to the humanitarian interference concept which the Security Council 
developed during the 1990s leading to different humanitarian emergency 
situations which were declared threats to international peace and security34.  
The above would suggest that the description of threat to international 
peace and security applies to both internal and international acts of terrorism, 
wherever and by whomsoever they are committed, and whether linked to a 
particular State or not. This again brings us back to the significance of the 
leading role played by States in defining what is meant by terrorism and the 
                                            
33 On the basis of this situation, as early as 1992 Pablo Antonio Fernández Sánchez pointed out 
that there had been an internationalisation of terrorist acts, in so far as they affect human beings. For a 
more in-depth study in this area see the above author’s work La obligación internacional de cooperar en 
la lucha contra el terrorismo, Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid, 1992, p. 22 and 23 et seq.   
34 There is a presentation on Security Council practice for humanitarian purposes in internal 
situations in Rosa Giles Carnero, De la asistencia a la injerencia  humanitaria: la práctica reciente del 
Consejo de Seguridad, Universidad de Huelva-Cruz Roja Española, Huelva, 1997, pp. 43 et seq.  
risks this entails. In the case of internal terrorism, state interests in counter-
terrorism are heightened and certain abuses may occur which can be protected 
by Security Council -- counter-terrorism obligations.   
 
Conclusions. 
 It is clear that in recent years the Security Council has decided to 
intervene on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in a 
sphere like counter-terrorism which is of exceeding concern to its permanent 
members --. The reiteration of the seriousness of this threat to peace represents 
a prior choice of what this organ considers to be its primary sphere of action in 
maintaining international peace and security. However, after evaluating this 
global problem as being more serious than others, a general permanent 
description has been chosen which generates several legal and operational 
risks.  
This classification, which includes no specific definition of terrorism, 
means that a notion such as terrorism whose definition has proved elusive after 
decades of international negotiations, becomes the basis to activate Chapter VII 
measures. The argument to support this strategy is mainly based on reasons of 
effectiveness, but the point remains as to whether it is being used to violate the 
limits on Security Council action imposed by the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations Charter. 
The Security Council has acquired a significant leading role in counter-
terrorism and appears to have obtained the majority support of States in the 
International Community for its decisions. However, the doubts as to the legality 
of its actions may seriously impair the operational capacity of coercively 
established counter-terrorism systems. The Security Council has replaced the 
capacity of States to develop an effective treaty-based system of counter-
terrorism. – 
Practice has clearly demonstrated the problems surrounding a general 
consensus on international counter-terrorism action, but whether the solution 
lies in Chapter VII imposition of cooperation systems remains to be seen. There 
is a continuing need for consensus in this area which would not appear to be 
helped by the fact that some States are able to obtain coercive Security Council 
action. Practice in the years to come will have to resolve the uncertainties 
raised and demonstrate whether the commitment to effectiveness has in fact 
been successful.   
 
 
